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ABSTRACT 
In this paper we bring together agency, stakeholder, institutional and resource-
dependence theories to study the direct and interactive effects of country regulation and 
competition on two dimensions of corporate governance: the overall quality of corporate 
governance of firms in a country, and firm-to-firm variations in corporate governance. 
Interactive conditions are more representative of the real-world context of corporate governance, 
and the contradictory pressures that firms face in such interactive conditions are better explained 
through the use of multiple theories of corporate governance. Using a dataset that spans 15 
countries and includes 463 firms, we find that firm corporate governance is better in conditions 
where either regulation or competition is well-developed, by comparison with interactive 
conditions. We also find that while regulation enhances within- country convergence, it is likely 
that competition serves to enhance across-country convergence. 
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WHEN IS TWO REALLY COMPANY? THE INTERACTIVE EFFECTS OF 
COMPETITION AND REGULATION ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
Corporate governance, defined as “the determination of the broad uses to which 
organizational resources will be deployed and the resolution of conflicts among the myriad 
participants in organizations” (Daily, Dalton, & Canella, 2003: 371), has been a key domain of 
research, given its relevance to both firm performance and overall efficiency of the business 
environment. While firms are concerned with the competitive aspects of corporate governance, 
policy-makers attempt to bring about better governance practices, and consequently foster a 
better business climate, through regulation. However, despite the large volumes of work on the 
issue of country environments (e.g. LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998; 
LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997), the interactive impact of 
regulatory pressures and competitive forces on firm corporate governance has received relatively 
less attention.  
In general, the legal environment has a strong effect on firm corporate governance 
(LaPorta et al., 1998). Market competition also has a disciplinary effect on firms by driving 
inefficient firms out (Alchian, 1950; Stigler, 1958), and making monitoring more efficient 
(Holmstrom, 1982; Nalebuff & Stiglitz, 1983). However, while competition reduces 
expropriation by managers, in itself it may be insufficient to engender better corporate 
governance (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Regulation, without a commensurate emphasis on 
competition may lead to compliance by firms in order to avoid punitive measures, but lacks 
positive incentives for firms to enhance governance. This may distort the governance incentives 
of the firm‟s managers and produce highly inefficient outcomes. Firms may also improve their 
corporate governance, in a bid to attract positive attention from market intermediaries (Khanna & 
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Palepu, 2000), and thereby enhance the resources available to them from labor, product and 
capital markets. Regulation and competition therefore provide different types of incentives for 
firms to enhance corporate governance. In the case of regulatory pressures, firms are likely to 
consider the costs of non-compliance, whereas in the case of competitive forces, the focus would 
be on resultant benefits, such as differential access to resources, and reduced agency costs.  
To reconcile these potentially contradictory pressures requires reliance on more than one 
theory of corporate governance alone, essentially since the governance behavior of firms in 
different interactive conditions is likely to be based on different motivations. While the 
institutional and stakeholder perspectives of corporate governance suggest that compliance with 
regulatory mandate is an important consideration for firms, agency and resource-dependence 
theories highlight the potential competitive benefits that may arise from corporate governance. 
Yet the resources available to firms may be limited, and environment pressures to comply may 
vary, with the result that regulation and competition may not always work in tandem. We 
therefore take a multi-theoretical perspective to explore the interactive effects of regulation and 
competition on firm corporate governance, as well as on corporate governance convergence. 
Using a dataset that spans 15 countries and includes 463 firms, we find that firm corporate 
governance is better in conditions where either regulation or competition is well-developed, by 
comparison with interactive conditions. We also find that while regulation enhances within-
country convergence, competition serves to enhance across-country convergence. 
 
BACKGROUND 
Regulation and Competition 
We define regulation as positive legislation and mandate, designed to enhance investor 
and shareholder protection, as opposed to the possible interpretation of regulation as an 
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impediment or obstacle to efficient conduct of business. This is in keeping with previous 
operationalizations of regulation, in terms of shareholder protection (LaPorta et al., 1998), 
judicial efficiency, and support for business (Klapper & Love, 2002), and also positions our 
paper in line with prior findings that positively associate the level of regulation in an 
environment with the quality of corporate governance therein. Similarly, we define competition 
as the operation of market mechanisms, which allow for the conduct of business whereby 
stronger competition leads to more efficient markets. Therefore, conditions with strong 
regulation and competition, in general, are viewed as desirable.  
Our choice of regulation and competition as the predictor variables of interest is 
motivated partly by emerging research and partly by practice. Both social factors, such as 
regulation, and economic factors, such as the competitive environment, influence corporate 
governance, distinctly, and interactively (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003). Each of these forces shares 
links with the other (Aoki, 2001), and the influence of one may even be contingent on the other 
(Aguilera & Jackson, 2003). Further, governance practices found in the real world tend to 
emerge from a confluence of the actions of managers and policy-makers: Policy-makers attempt 
to change the governance environment through regulation, and managers, while concerned with 
regulation, would also be driven strongly by the competitive environment, in their decision-
making.  
 
Corporate Governance 
The basic postulate of this paper is that regulation and competition, directly and 
interactively, affect firm corporate governance. We highlight two aspects of corporate 
governance as being of relevance here: 
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Firm Corporate Governance. First, we are interested in assessing the extent to which a 
firm has mechanisms and practices that allow for the fulfillment of the aims of corporate 
governance, including specifically the maximization of shareholder value, and balancing 
stakeholder interests, as put forth in Daily, Dalton & Canella (2003)‟s broad definition. 
Academic research uses specific indicators drawn from the underlying theory to determine the 
quality of corporate governance, such as CEO characteristics (Jensen & Zajac, 2004); 
compensation (Cyert, Kang & Kumar, 2002); and board diversity (Carter, Simkins, & Simpson, 
2003). Some researchers have also sought to combine many of these indicators to arrive at scores 
or indices of firm corporate governance, for example, the Governance Index (Gompers, Ishii & 
Metrick, 2003), the Entrenchment Index (Bebchuk & Cohen, 2005; Bebchuk, Cohen & Ferrel, 
2004), and the Anti-takeover (ATI) Index (Cremers & Nair, 2005). Recently, practitioner and 
consulting organizations such as Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia, Governance Metrics 
International, and Standard & Poor offer firm scores or rankings based on a variety of 
governance indicators, many of which are derived from academic research, such as board 
independence and CEO compensation. Our first dependent variable therefore is a numerical 
quantification of governance quality, as represented by a firm‟s score for corporate governance.  
Our interest in this element of corporate governance stems from the evidence that 
suggests that better corporate governance leads to better performance (e.g. Black, Jang, & Kim, 
2003; Durnev & Kim, 2003; Peng, 2004)
1
. Despite our reliance on multiple theories, this seems 
                                                 
1
 At this point, we believe it is important to distinguish between the arguments we present and 
seemingly contradictory evidence. A series of meta-analyses by Dalton and colleagues on 
ownership (Dalton, Daily, Certo, & Roengpitya, 2003), board composition (Dalton, Daily 
Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1998) and board size (Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1999) suggests 
that there is no significant link between corporate governance and performance. These studies 
examine only certain facets of corporate governance, such as board of directors, and ownership, 
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to be a point of consistency between these different perspectives. Under the agency theory, firm 
performance is augmented by reduced costs of capital (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Under the 
resource-dependence theory good corporate governance can provide the firm with increased 
resources (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). Efficient stakeholder management contributes to firm 
performance (Hillman & Keim, 2001), and consonance with the demands of the institutional 
environment can provide access to resources such as legitimacy, and thereby enhance 
performance (Suchman, 1995).  
Variation in corporate governance. Second, we are interested in the relative similarities 
or differences in corporate governance scores of firms in a particular country, as represented by 
our second dependent variable: the variation in a firm‟s corporate governance from the 
environmental average. This issue is linked to the debate on convergence of corporate 
governance, which is briefly summarized thus: While on the one hand, researchers predict that 
global forces will lead to convergence of corporate governance practices towards the Anglo-
American model (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003), others point to the effects of historical path-
dependence in fostering variation (Bebchuk & Roe, 1999). Yet others argue for some level of 
convergence, though towards a hybrid model that takes into account differences in governance 
systems (Aoki, 1990).  
This issue is of interest from a strategic point of view, since it is representative of the 
debate on organizational consistency, in the specific context of corporate governance. The 
Weberian perspective suggests that close adherence to „rules‟ enhances organizational efficiency, 
accountability and co-ordination, which in turn may result in performance benefits (Weber, 
1946). Such consistency also reduces uncertainty, and enhances accountability and reliability in 
                                                                                                                                                             
severally and distinctly. We are concerned with the overall effect of mechanisms and practices 
that constitute corporate governance, and refer therefore to research that shares the same concern. 
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the eyes of stakeholders and exchange partners (Hannan & Freeman, 1977, 1984). In this paper 
therefore, we look at the effects of regulation and competition on consistency (or lack thereof) of 
corporate governance, within a given country context. Aguilera & Jackson (2003) distinguish 
between within-country and across-country convergence, to suggest that processes which support 
the former would actually inhibit the latter. In this way, our paper goes beyond the convergence 
debate as it is traditionally conceived, in that we examine within-country convergence and draw 
linkages from our conclusions thereon back to the issue of cross-country convergence.   
 
Theories of Corporate Governance 
We are interested in how different theories of corporate governance inform the 
mechanisms underlying the effects of regulation and competition on corporate governance. 
While agency and resource-dependence theories provide links to the competitive elements of 
corporate governance, institutional and stakeholder theory together suggest that compliance with 
norms and mandate also drives firm corporate governance.  
Agency theory. The classical arguments of Jensen & Meckling (1976) suggest that 
ownership and managerial interest may not be aligned, leading to agency costs (Jensen, 1986; 
Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The concern of the domain of corporate governance has long been to 
resolve the agency issue (Daily, Dalton, & Rajagopalan, 2003; Tsipouri & Xanthakis, 2004), 
particularly since such resolution would increase firm performance, by reducing agency costs 
and increasing internal efficiencies. Agency theory therefore also leads to the postulate that firms 
with high levels of agency are likely to face threats from firms in the environment, through the 
mechanism of the market for corporate control (Jensen & Ruback, 1983). This presumes the 
operation of an efficient competitive environment, in which information asymmetries are 
minimal, and competitive pressures are high. Efficient competition is also a precondition to the 
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general notion that reduced agency and increased managerial efficiency would lead to 
performance benefits, in the form of increased economic valuation by the market within which 
the firm operates. We therefore propose generally that the agency theory of corporate governance 
is likely to explain the effects on firm corporate governance particularly in competitive 
environments. 
Resource-dependence theory. Boards of directors can be a key source of various 
resources (Pfeffer, 1972), based on human capital, such as advice and expertise, and social 
capital, such as legitimacy and links to other organizations, cumulatively described as board 
capital (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). The relationship between board capital and firm performance 
is well documented (Dalton et al., 1999; Pfeffer, 1972), thereby making the resource dependence 
view a key theory in corporate governance. However, this view essentially presumes that firms 
are in a position to benefit from their board capital, implying that the organization is an efficient 
one. The general proposition that such human capital is of value also presumes the existence of a 
reasonably efficient labor market. Similarly, relational capital, such as channels of 
communication, is likely to be of more value in situations where such channels offer firms a 
competitive edge or increased advantage over their competitors. The resource-dependence theory, 
therefore,  is also best applied in competitive environments.  
Stakeholder theory. Freeman, (1984) in his work on stakeholder theory, proposes the 
concept of stakeholder management to address the ethical and moral considerations of business 
alongside the more competitive ones. Such views have gained much force with suggestions that 
the practice of stakeholder management will contribute positively to the performance of firms 
(Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Hillman & Keim, 2001). However, the emphasis on stakeholders 
may vary in keeping with the levels of protection that are provided to various stakeholder groups. 
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Prior research shows that firm value is higher in countries with better protection of minority 
shareholders, (LaPorta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2002), and in countries with 
strong protection of minority investor rights, overinvestment in declining industries is curbed 
(Wurgler, 2000). In general the operation of an effective system of stakeholder management by 
firms therefore assumes that such stakeholders are identified and recognized through legislation. 
Institutional theory. Institutional theory has long advocated the performance benefits of 
consonance with the institutional environment (Arthur, 2003; Hart & Milstein, 2003; Oliver, 
1997). The economic benefits of legitimacy are dependent on such consonance (Suchman, 1995). 
Specifically institutions impact firm corporate governance (e.g. Gillian & Starks, 2001; Shleifer 
& Vishny, 1997). Institutional actors also lead to reduced “earnings management”, or the 
alteration of firms‟ reported economic performance by insiders (Leuz, Nanda, & Wysocki, 2003). 
However, the institutional perspective on corporate governance assumes that the business 
environment is adequately regulated, and both recognizes and empowers institutions to reward 
firms with, or withhold from firms resources such as legitimacy. Therefore, the tenets of 
institutional theory are also best met in a business environment with strong regulation. 
 
HYPOTHESES: A MODEL OF THE EFFECTS OF REGULATION AND 
COMPETITION 
Firm Corporate Governance Score 
Drawing mainly from the institutional and stakeholder perspectives of corporate 
governance, we argue, in keeping with the findings of prior research (La Porta et al, 1998, 1999) 
that regulation would have a positive impact on corporate governance. Where regulation is 
strong, firms would comply with mandate in order to avoid potential punitive repercussions. 
Since such regulation may empower stakeholders, and better afford protection to their rights, 
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firms may place more focus on managing these stakeholders, and meeting their interests. 
Therefore, while essentially a restatement of such prior findings, in the interests of clarity we 
hypothesize as follows. 
 
H1. Regulation has a positive effect on firm corporate governance scores. 
 
Drawing from the link between corporate governance and performance, as competition 
grows intense, firms may use corporate governance as a means to gain some sort of competitive 
benefit, such as reduced costs of capital, or access to resources. We therefore use both agency 
and resource-dependence theories here to highlight the potential uses of corporate governance to 
gain some form of competitive edge. Corporate governance in itself may serve to enhance 
legitimacy and draw favorable attention to the firm (Khanna & Palepu, 2004a), as well as reduce 
the costs of capital (Stulz, 1996; 1998), and enhance the availability of resources (Peng, 2004; 
Hillman & Keim, 2001). Competitive forces operating in the larger business environment may 
exert a disciplinarian effect on firm corporate governance, and increase productive efficiency 
(Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2003). Where contracts protecting investors from expropriation are 
enforced by the market, the regulation of financial markets would be unnecessary (Stigler, 1964; 
Easterbrook & Fiskel, 1991). In fact, deregulation leads to the development of alternative, 
internal governance mechanisms by firms, for strategic reasons (Kim & Prescott, 2005; Hillman, 
Cannella & Paetzold, 2000), and increases the importance of the managerial function (Kole & 
Lehn, 1997). This suggests that competitive forces, in themselves serve to enhance corporate 
governance, distinct from the positive effects of regulation. We therefore hypothesize as follows. 
 
H2. Competition has a positive effect on firm corporate governance scores. 
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In the preceding sections we identify two benefits arising from corporate governance. 
While the argument supporting the positive effects of regulation is that firms would choose to 
comply to avoid punitive costs, the competitive process is characterized by gain, rather than cost 
avoidance. In competitive conditions, firms would use corporate governance to gain competitive 
benefits, such as lower costs of capital. However, in conditions where regulation is strong, firms 
would have already benefited from the reduced agency costs and increased resource availability 
that accrue under agency and resource-dependence theories respectively. Here, stakeholder and 
institutional theories would serve to explain firm compliance with legal mandate. 
In such situations, firms may not find it efficient to allocate their resources towards 
further enhancing corporate governance, particularly when such resources may be used 
beneficially in more traditional forms of competition. That is, we propose that the dual benefits 
arising from regulation and competition, may not be distinct, but rather the former may subsume 
the latter, when both regulation and competition are strong. Firms in such interactive conditions 
may not be highly-rewarded for their corporate governance, since many, if not all firms would 
comply with mandate to avoid punitive costs. The benefits arising from competition therefore are 
diluted. Faced with overall competitive pressures, and little competitive benefits forthcoming 
from governance, firms may even consider restricting the resources they devote to corporate 
governance. Firms aiming to comply with mandate may also be restricted from doing so, due to 
inadequacy of resources, given the competitive environment. We therefore propose that the 
interaction of regulation and competition embodies contrasting pressures, and therefore 
hypothesize:  
 
H3. The interaction of competition and regulation has a negative effect on firm corporate 
governance scores. 
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Variation in Corporate Governance 
The effects of regulation proposed in literature thus far have been derived mainly from 
institutional and stakeholder perspectives of corporate governance. Institutional theory suggests 
that regulatory forces work predominantly through mechanisms of coercive isomorphism (Scott, 
2001). The coercive nature of a well-defined regulatory environment would require that firm 
corporate governance meets legally set standards. Such regulatory regimes also result in a 
historical, or path dependent effect. For example, the historical bank monitoring systems in Japan 
could be linked to labor market practices (Aoki, 1994) and extent of equity cross-holdings by 
firms (Berglof & Perotti, 1994). Since firms within a given country environment are equally 
exposed to a specific regulatory regime, it is logical that firms within this regime would tend to 
have similar corporate governance, with little deviation from the country average. Particularly, as 
regulation increases, either through additional mandate, or through an increase in monitoring and 
enforcement of existing mandate, the coercive nature of this environmental force would ensure 
higher compliance with prescribed standards, and consequently, reduce the possible diversity in 
firm corporate governance, within a given country. The process of coercive isomorphism is 
therefore identified as a likely explanation for homogenization of corporate governance within a 
country. 
As firms attempt to address the interests of multiple stakeholders, given the 
empowerment of the latter in well-regulated environments, the likelihood of variation in 
corporate governance decreases. The more the stakeholders being addressed by each firm, the 
greater the possibility of overlap in stakeholder groups across firms, leading to similarities in 
corporate governance across the latter. Also, in environments with strong and efficient regulation, 
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there will be a trend towards convergence on the mandated standards of corporate governance, 
thereby reducing the variation in firm corporate governance. We therefore hypothesize: 
 
H4. Regulation has a negative effect on variation in firm corporate governance scores. 
 
The competitive business environment is, by implicit definition in the preceding sections, 
one that allows for efficient information exchange, and where the response of the market to 
information is fast. In such an environment, therefore, firms are likely to aim to benefit from 
reduced agency costs, increased monitoring, and availability of resources through improved 
corporate governance. Earlier, we have used agency and resource-dependence perspectives to 
suggest that competition affects corporate governance, essentially since better governance may 
lead to better firm performance. In this section, we call upon the same two theories: agency and 
resource-dependence, to examine the effect of competition on variation in corporate governance. 
While, as discussed in previous sections, competition is likely to enhance firm corporate 
governance, more benefits are likely to accrue to firms which not only exhibit good governance, 
but also display governance that is better than that of competitors.  
As firms compete with each other on the basis of governance, the relative quality of 
corporate governance becomes important. Profit may be dependent not only on deriving benefits 
from corporate governance, but on deriving significantly more benefits from corporate 
governance than competitors. That is, it becomes important to benefit from costs of capital lower 
than that of competitors, and enjoy differential access to resources that cannot be easily 
replicated. For this reason, many firms are likely to bring about governance that is not only of a 
good quality, but also exceeds, or is distinct from general practice, since it may be possible for 
firms to gain some benefit or premium by displaying corporate governance that is better than the 
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norm. Firms may benefit from increased legitimacy, beneficial comparisons, and enhanced 
reputation, leading to better valuation in the market, as well as differential access to various 
resources. In such a case, the forces of competition are likely to work to increase variation in 
corporate governance. 
 
H5. Competition has a positive effect on variation in firm corporate governance scores.  
 
However, the effects of competition may be contingent on the level of regulation in the 
environment. Where regulation is inadequate, competitive forces may enhance isomorphism, 
though through mimetic processes that are distinct from the coercive processes associated with 
regulation. Scott (2001) identifies the mimetic branch of institutional influence as cognitive in its 
basis, suggesting that the institutional perspective, in addition to agency and resource-
dependence theories, may be useful in explaining the effects of competition on variation in 
corporate governance. Compliance with mimetic influences suggests that firms respond by 
tending towards isomorphism on the basis of a cognitive decision to benefit from imitation, 
given that they may not have enough information to construct alternatives (Scott, 2001). This 
decision comes from the cognitive evaluation of the need to take a profitable, performance-
enhancing decision, even if the decision is to imitate an action that has benefited comparable 
firms.  
Consequently firms are likely to display mimetic isomorphism when a) informational 
asymmetries inhibit the pursuit of competitive advantages, and/or b) when the firm adopts 
imitation as a competitive tactic, irrespective of the availability of information, to enjoy 
resource-linked benefits available to firms that are being imitated. That is, firms may sometimes 
benefit concurrently from institutional and resource-dependence processes linked to corporate 
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governance (Peng, 2004). Isomorphism can also be a source of legitimacy for firms (Deephouse, 
1996; Hillman & Wan, 2005; Suchman, 1995), and such legitimacy may confer advantages in 
terms of access to resources, as well as enhanced reputation. Further, adapting to country 
standards, as evidenced by other firms, may be essential for firm survival (Duysters & 
Haagdoorn, 2001), and firms may tend to converge on some mandated or normative practices in 
order to reduce the threat of takeovers. This would have the effect of creating clusters of firms, 
with similar governance, but these clusters are in themselves likely to be distinct from each other, 
in terms of governance, leading to a considerable degree of firm-to-firm variation in corporate 
governance
2
. 
Where regulation is strong, competition may not affect variation in corporate governance 
in the same manner. Since regulation is supported by the possibility of punitive costs for non-
compliance, the convergence effects of regulation and the divergence effects of competition may 
lead to conflicting pressures. Therefore while in certain conditions, the interaction of regulation 
and competition may reduce variation somewhat, in general, it is likely to have a positive effect, 
as hypothesized below. 
 
H6. The interaction of regulation and competition has a positive effect on variation in firm 
corporate governance. 
 
Table 1 summarises these hypotheses and shows the linkages between the four theories of 
corporate governance, regulatory and competitive environments. 
Insert Table 1 about here 
                                                 
2
 We are grateful to a colleague for suggestions that led to the development of this particular 
argument. 
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The Distribution of Corporate Governance 
In the preceding sections we hypothesized that regulation and competition would have a 
negative interactive effect on firm corporate governance, and a positive interactive effect on the 
firm-to-firm variation in corporate governance. However, we are also interested in understanding 
the differences in corporate governance across broad categories of interactive conditions. In this 
section, we elaborate on the likely distribution of corporate governance across four broad 
conditions captured by dichotomous distinctions (strong and weak) of regulation and 
competition. 
Given the conflicting incentives in the processes of competition and regulation, the effect 
of regulation on firm corporate governance is likely to be most pronounced in environments with 
less emphasis on competition. As a consequence, in environments with strong regulatory 
efficiency but weak competition, there will be a tendency towards convergence on the high, 
legally-set, standards of corporate governance. In such environments, the costs of non-
compliance may outweigh possible benefits of reducing costs associated with corporate 
governance, and instead result in congruence between institutional, stakeholder, agency and 
resource-based incentives for corporate governance. We therefore suggest that such 
environments would exemplify the best corporate governance, by comparison with other 
environments. Also, in such an environment, firms are not likely to benefit from a competitive 
stance that draws on corporate governance to gain either increased legitimacy or increased 
efficiency, since many firms, if not all, would meet mandated corporate governance standards, 
thereby reducing the variation in firm corporate governance to be the least across all 
environments. 
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Environments with strong regulation and strong competition showcase intensely 
competitive conditions, where the basics of corporate governance are relatively well-established. 
Firms would need to commit considerable resources in order to outdo their rivals and sustain 
their competitive advantage on the basis of corporate governance; particularly since the efficient 
business environment and competitive processes therein would recognize and reward only 
relatively distinctive corporate governance. At the point when firm corporate governance is 
reasonably homogenous across the environment, then no firm is likely to have a competitive 
edge based on corporate governance. Firms in such environments also face strong competition, 
and may therefore attempt to reduce costs associated with corporate governance, though only to 
the extent that it does not invoke the punitive costs of non-compliance that are likely in well-
regulated environments. This would lead to moderately high firm corporate governance, with 
relatively little variation across firms. 
In environments that are not well-regulated, firm may face some uncertainty as to what 
would constitute efficient and/or acceptable standards of corporate governance. In such 
environments, firms are likely to choose imitation as a means of dealing with such environmental 
uncertainty (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Henisz & Delios, 2001). As firms imitate the corporate 
governance of other firms in the environment to achieve competitive parity, homogenization is 
enhanced. However, conditions of weak regulation and strong competition also exemplify 
instances where it becomes important for firms to attract the attention of market intermediaries. 
Well-governed firms benefit more in environments with inadequate laws (Klapper & Love, 
2002), since they may be able to beneficially distinguish themselves on the basis of corporate 
governance. These incentives however, would not provide the impetus required to meet the high 
standards of governance mandated in environment where regulation is, by comparison, stronger. 
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Particularly, those firms with above-average corporate governance may have little incentive to 
further enhance their governance, given that there is no legally-defined „high standard‟ of 
governance, leading overall, to moderate firm corporate governance scores.  
The interaction of both weak regulation and weak competition is a somewhat unique 
situation. These environments are the least structured, and therefore not supportive of either 
competition or compliance on the basis of corporate governance. Doidge, Karolyi & Stulz (2004) 
postulate that in economies with poor regulatory development, firms will find it difficult to 
commit to good governance, particularly because adopting good governance practices involves 
costs, without any associated benefits. In the absence of regulatory mandate, firms are not 
required to comply, and given the absence of any competitive benefits, firms may not invest their 
resources towards enhancing corporate governance. It is likely that the utility of good corporate 
governance is perceived to be limited, and attempts to implement corporate governance practices 
are highly idiosyncratic to firms. Therefore, such environments are likely to embody the lowest 
levels of corporate governance. 
However, it is not possible to conclude that corporate governance is completely absent in 
such environments. Particularly, some firms may view corporate governance as a means to 
compensate for the perceived lack of business efficiency and transparency in the country, and a 
few outstanding firms may exhibit better corporate governance in a bid to attract positive 
attention (Khanna & Palepu, 2004a). Firms which are able to compensate for the inadequate 
institutionalization of the country environment, for example, through business groups as 
substitutes for financial institutions (Khanna & Palepu, 2000; 2004b), may not gain from 
exhibiting better corporate governance. In such an environment there is likely to be a large 
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variation in firm corporate governance. These arguments can be summarized to present the 
following set of hypotheses: 
 
H7:  Firm corporate governance scores in the strong regulation - weak competition 
condition > in the strong regulation - strong competition condition > in the weak 
regulation - strong competition condition > in the weak regulation - weak competition 
condition. 
 
H8: Variation in firm corporate governance scores in the weak regulation - weak 
competition condition > in the weak regulation - strong competition condition > in the 
strong regulation - strong competition condition > in the strong regulation - weak 
competition condition. 
Figure 1 shows the hypothesized dispersion of governance over the four conditions. 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
METHODS 
Data and Sample 
In order to test the hypotheses we use a cross-country dataset of 463 firms from 15 
countries covered by the 2001 Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA) report.  The CLSA report 
is a recent, annual publication, which covers mainly emerging countries, located in Asia, Latin 
America, Europe and Africa, though developed economies such as Hong Kong and Singapore 
contribute to a sizeable a portion of the data. Table 2 shows the distribution of firms over the 
various countries. Due to the low number of observations in three Latin American countries, 
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namely Brazil, Chile and Mexico, firms in these countries were clubbed together as representing 
the South American region
3
. 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
Our data on corporate governance comes from the aforementioned CLSA report. Firms 
are scored on their corporate governance through a questionnaire filled out by CLSA analysts in 
each country
4
. These data have been well-used in recent studies (Black, Jang, & Kim, 2003; 
Chen, Chen, & Wei, 2003; Doidge, Karolyi, & Stulz, 2004; Durnev & Kim, 2003; Klapper & 
Love, 2002; Krishnamurti, Sevic, & Sevic, 2003). Particularly, Palepu et al. (2002) use the 
CLSA report in their study of convergence in corporate governance, at the country-level, and 
also note, after testing, that the CLSA data does indeed meet the standards of reliability required. 
We chose the CLSA report as our source of data on corporate governance instead of other 
available academic and practitioner indices for two reasons: a) the construction of the index with 
emphasis on the most number of indicators or mechanisms of governance, and b) the availability 
of data for as many countries as possible. 
 
Variables 
Independent Variables. Our source of data on the independent variables used in this 
study is the World Competitiveness Report (WCR) 2000, which has also been used recently by 
other researchers (Glaeser, Johnson, & Shleifer, 2001; Yiu & Makino, 2002; Wan & Hoskisson, 
                                                 
3
 The values of the independent variables, regulation and competition were found to be similar 
for these three countries, as were the values of the dependent variables. We therefore submit that 
aggregating data from these three countries into a single region is appropriate. 
4
 The questionnaire assesses the companies on 57 main issues based on seven key criteria derived 
from the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (2000): Management discipline, 
transparency, accountability, responsibility, fairness, and social responsibility, and is designed 
such that all questions have binary answers (yes/no), so that the analyst‟s subjectivity is reduced.  
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2003). We lagged the independent variable by a year, in order to allow time for firms to respond 
to environmental forces. The WCR ranks countries on four components, Government Efficiency, 
Economic Performance, Business Efficiency and Infrastructure, covering a total of 286 criteria. 
Using a standard deviation method (SDM) that is discussed in detail in each edition of the World 
Competitiveness Yearbook, the criteria are scaled to compute the overall competitiveness factor, 
and its components, for each country surveyed. We used two of these components, Government 
Efficiency, which covers 73 criteria, as proxy for the strength of coercive forces in a country; and 
Economic Performance, which covers 79 criteria, as proxy for the strength of mimetic forces, as 
these two components were best suited to capture the conditions based on mimetic and coercive 
influences, as we conceptualized them.  
The Government Efficiency component emphasizes the existence, strength and efficiency 
of various governmental entities, their functions and regulatory activities, which capture both the 
presence and strength of regulatory forces, particularly as it is relevant to business. Included in 
this component are sub-components dealing with the nature and quality of various business 
legislation, role of the central bank, and extent of protectionism, among others. We prefer this 
measure of overall efficacy of the regulatory environment, over measures of legislation alone, to 
capture both the existence of mandate and its adequate and efficient enforcement. In keeping 
with our definition of regulation as a positive impetus to business, the government efficiency 
component accords a lower ranking to countries that have protectionist regulation that impairs 
economic development (such as subsidies), or is inflexible. Political interference in judicial 
process and bureaucratic inefficiency are also considered as negative. The component also 
includes variables that examine the role of the judiciary, existing legislation and potential to 
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introduce legislation, transparency, and corruption, suggesting that the government efficiency 
component of the WCR is a valid measure of regulation, in the context of this study. 
Similarly, the Economic Performance component covers basic economic and competitive 
elements such as foreign and domestic trade, foreign investment, threats to factors of production, 
economic health of the economy and potential for growth, which captures the overall competitive 
health of the country economy, and therefore would reflect the likelihood that firms would use 
their corporate governance mechanisms in order to meet competitive pressures. For example, the 
potential to access capital markets, and foreign investments, as captured by the WCR (Pol, 
2003), could impact firm corporate governance (Fiss & Zajac, 2004), and may provide incentive 
for firms to engage in mimetic behavior vis-à-vis corporate governance. This component 
includes variables traditionally considered as indicators of the level of competition in countries, 
such as GDP and Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), as well as recent factors that are linked to 
competition and market efficiency, such as economic resilience, real growth rates of goods and 
services, exports and employment, as well as Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and outflow of 
investment. 
We therefore identify the WCR in general, and „Government Efficiency‟ and „Economic 
Performance‟ to be appropriate measures of coercive and mimetic influences, for this study5. 
Specifically, we tested these two components of the WCR against other measures to establish 
their reliability. We found that our measure of regulation is strongly correlated with another 
measure of regulation used in prior corporate governance research - the Government Efficiency 
component is very strongly correlated with the country measure of „legality‟ used by Klapper & 
                                                 
5
 The „Infrastructure‟ and „Business Efficiency‟ components were examined for the relevance of 
their constituent elements, and were found to be less relevant to the issue under examination in 
this paper, as compared to the two components that we used. 
  
23 
 
Love (2002) in their study of corporate governance (0.9, p < 0.01). We also found that the 
Economic Performance component is strongly correlated with the Global Competitiveness 
Rankings reported by the World Economic Forum (0.59, p < 0.01), suggesting that it is an 
accurate and reliable measure of competition.  
To test hypotheses seven and eight, we coded the regulation and competition scores for 
each country into categorical variables– „1‟ for strong, and „0‟ for weak, based on whether they 
fall below or above the middle rank for population subgroup covered by the WCR (greater than 
or less than 20 million) 
6
. We calculate the four combinations of these two components of the 
environment, namely weak/strong regulation and weak/strong competition. The spread of 
countries across the four conditions is also given as part of Table 2. We find that Indonesia, 
Philippines and Turkey fare poorly on both the regulation and competition components. India 
and Korea exhibit strong competition, but remain poor on regulation. South Africa and Latin 
America are strong on regulation, but weak on competition. Six of the fifteen countries in our 
sample exhibit strong regulation and strong competition. While economies such as Singapore, 
Hong Kong and Taiwan could be expected to fall into this condition, we found it particularly 
interesting to see that China, Malaysia and Thailand were also in this group. In order to explore 
the possible reasons for the classification, as well as to further enhance the reliability of our 
measures, we looked into qualitative factors that may explain the position of all countries over 
the four conditions. A brief description of the countries, as well as justification of their 
classification, is given in Appendix A. 
                                                 
6
 The bifurcation of rankings according to country size, for the year 2000, was made 
retrospectively available by IMD in 2003, and was advised as a more accurate representation of 
the relative position of countries as per the WCR. 
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Dependent Variables. Firm corporate governance scores are the dependent variables for 
hypotheses one to three,  and hypothesis seven.  We measured firm corporate governance using 
the weighted average of the seven components of the CLSA corporate governance scores. 
Variation in corporate governance scores of firms is the dependent variable for hypotheses four 
to six, and hypothesis eight.  Our measure for this dependent variable is sensitive to both the 
number of firms in the country, as well as the difference in firm corporate governance scores. 
The sum of the values of this variable, for all firms in a given country, would give the variance 
of corporate governance scores for the population of firms in that country, in our dataset.  
  
(Country Average CG – score Firm CG score) 2 
 
 Ncountry - 1 
 
 
Control variables. Since our hypotheses examine broadly the social and economic 
contexts of corporate governance, there remains little by way of environmental factors that are 
not covered under the purview of these two variables. We remain conscious that inclusion of 
further variables in our model may result in over-specification, though admittedly, it may 
contribute positively to the statistical outcomes of our tests. In order to avoid such potential over-
specification, and also bearing in mind that the focus of our testing is predictive, as opposed to 
explanatory, we consciously trade-off the explanatory potential of our model as a whole for 
accurate predictive capability. However, given that our process of calculating the two 
independent variables, regulation and competition, involves rankings which are bifurcated on the 
basis of country size, we included a control variable to capture potential effects of the same. We 
control for country size using a simple categorical variable which has a value of 0 if the 
population of the country was less than 20 million, and a value of 1 if the population was 20 
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million or greater, following the WCR classification of country size. We specifically do not 
control for industry and firm-level effects, in the interests of parsimony. Recent literature 
suggests that with the exception of the distinction between financial services and non-financial 
services, industry does not seem to affect corporate governance (Doidge, Karolyi & Stulz, 2004; 
Palepu, Khanna & Kogan, 2002). While many firm-level variables could be argued to affect 
corporate governance, we do not identify any firm characteristics as being of specific relevance 
to the broad links drawn here between country characteristics and firm corporate governance. We 
therefore have little theoretical basis to choose from the many firm characteristics that may be 
linked to corporate governance. Consequently, including such variables may reduce the 
parsimony of our model, and misrepresent the predictive power of our model by inflating the 
percentage of variance explained.  
Insert Table 3 about here 
 
Testing and Results 
We use a lag of a year between the independent and dependent variables, in order to 
ensure that firms have had time and opportunity to respond to environmental changes through 
their corporate governance practices. However, given the fast-paced nature of the competitive 
environment, as well as the quick operation of legislation in today‟s business context, we restrict 
this lag to one year. Standard diagnostic tests were performed on the data, including tests for 
normality and multicollinearity. Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) statistics for each of the models 
were used to check for multicollinearity. In all cases, the VIF statistics suggest that 
multicollinearity is not an issue. 
While our predictor variables are logically independent from each other, the creation of 
an interaction term resulted in significant correlations between the variables. We therefore used a 
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partial Gram-Schmidt transformation procedure (Burrill, 1997) to orthogonalize our interaction 
variable, and ensure its mathematical independence from the other predictor variables. This is in 
order to avoid high correlation and consequent spurious multicollinearity between the main 
effects and interaction variables, which may lead to unstable results and low tolerances, as well 
as inflate the proportion of variance explained by the model as a whole, despite low explanatory 
power of the regression coefficients. The procedure involves regressing the interaction variable 
on the two main effects variables (regulation and competition) to obtain standardized residuals, 
which are then used in subsequent procedures in place of the interaction variable. 
We then performed OLS regression to test hypotheses one to six. Our choice of this 
procedure, and the subsequent presentation of results derived thereby merits some explanation. 
While OLS regression is, in itself a well-accepted statistical procedure, we nevertheless had to 
address two concerns: a) the possibility of interrelation between our two dependent variables, 
and b) our data was likely to be right skewed, since few firms had governance scores close to 
zero, while many firms had governance scores close to the maximum possible score of one 
hundred. In the first case, the correlation between our two dependent variables firm corporate 
governance and variation in corporate governance is low (-0.13, p = 0.003) and therefore it is 
likely that the two dependent variables are not interrelated. However, we use the General Linear 
Models Multivariate Analysis (GLM-Multivariate) procedure in SPSS to simultaneously 
estimate the effects of the independent variables on both dependent variables. The results from 
the GLM-Multivariate procedure were identical to those obtained using OLS regression, 
suggesting that there is no significant relationship between the two dependent variables. We 
therefore present results only from the OLS procedure. 
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In order to address the second concern, and test the stability of our results we used a 
simple jack-knife procedure, wherein we further tested two sub-models derived from our dataset. 
The jackknife method (Crask & Perreault, 1977; Quenouille, 1949; Tukey, 1958) involves 
repetitively dropping different cases or subsets of cases from the analysis to determine how 
stable results are across various configurations of cases (Ang, 1998). In the first of our two sub-
models, we dropped the firms with the highest corporate governance scores in each country 
environment, to arrive at a reduced sample. Similarly, in the second sub-model we dropped the 
firm with the lowest corporate governance scores in each country environment, to arrive at a 
second reduced sample. We ran different OLS regression models for each of the dependent 
variables on these reduced datasets and found the results to be similar to the universal (full-
dataset) model
7
. Using procedures described in Yu (2003), the jack-knifed coefficients were 
computed by averaging the „pseudo-coefficients‟ from both sub-models, and these coefficients 
were then used to derive t-statistics to assess the stability of the coefficients. We concluded, on 
the basis of these results that our results from the universal model were stable.  
Using dummy variables to represent the four interactive conditions of regulation and 
competition, we ran tests of means using ANOVA to test hypotheses seven and eight. All results 
are presented below. Descriptives and bivariate correlations of dependent variables, independent 
variables, and the control variable are given in Table 3. Table 4 provides the results of the 
regression model.  
Insert Table 4 about here 
 
                                                 
7
 Results are available from the authors. 
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Regression Analysis. Two regression models were run to examine the main and 
interactive effects of regulation and competition on firm corporate governance, and variation in 
corporate governance, respectively. Results are presented in Table 4. Model 1 tests hypotheses 
one to three and model 2 tests hypotheses four to six. Both models are significant with R-square 
of 0.27 (F-value = 41.71, p = 0.000), and (F-value = 0.09, p = 0.000) respectively. The results 
from model 1 are as follows: The control for country size was positive and significant (β = 0.55, 
p = 0.000). The coefficient for regulation is positive and significant (β = 1.04, p = 0.000), 
providing support for hypothesis one. Contrary to our expectations, the effect of competition on 
firm corporate governance was negative (β = -0.64, p = 0.000). Therefore, hypothesis two was 
not supported. The coefficient for the variable capturing interaction between regulation and 
competition is negative and significant (β = -0.26, p = 0.000), thereby providing support for 
hypothesis 3. Model two tested the direct and interactive effects of regulation and competition on 
variation in firm corporate governance. The control for country size had a negative coefficient (β 
= -0.28, p = 0.001). As hypothesized, regulation had a negative and significant effect on 
variation (β = -0.42, p = 0.000), whereas competition, and the interaction of regulation and 
competition both had positive and significant effects (β = 0.28, p = 0.000; β = 0.29, p = 0.000, 
respectively). Hypotheses four, five and six are therefore supported.  
 
Insert Table 5 about here 
 
Comparison of Means. Tables 5 and 6 provide the results of one-way ANOVA tests, 
with firm corporate governance scores, and variation in firm corporate governance scores as the 
two dependent variables. These tests show that that there is a statistically significant difference in 
firm corporate governance scores, and variation in firm corporate governance scores across the 
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four conditions of strong/weak regulation and strong/weak competition (F = 50.34, p = 0.000; F 
= 21.55, p=0.000 respectively). Tukey‟s HSD post-hoc tests reveal that all the group means are 
significantly different from one another. Firms in environments characterized by strong 
regulation and weak competition have the highest corporate governance scores (mean = 64.47) 
followed by firms in environments with strong regulation and strong competition (mean = 
57.81), and then by firms in environments with weak regulation and strong competition (mean = 
53.4). Firms in environments with weak regulation and weak competition have the lowest 
corporate governance scores (mean = 41.43). Pairwise comparisons show that the difference in 
means across all four conditions are statistically significant, and fall in the order mentioned 
above, thereby providing support to hypothesis seven.  
Hypothesis eight was only partially supported. The results show that as hypothesized, 
variation is highest in the weak regulation – weak competition condition (mean = 7.30), and was 
lowest in strong regulation – weak competition condition (mean = 1.34). While the mean values 
of variation in the two former conditions were significantly different from each other and from 
values of mean variation in the weak regulation - strong competition and strong regulation – 
strong competition conditions (mean = 1.36, and 3.54 respectively), we failed to find a 
significant difference in the mean values of variation, between the latter two conditions. That is, 
we were unable to find support for part of hypothesis eight, which proposed that variation would 
be higher in the weak regulation – strong competition condition, as compared to the strong 
regulation – strong competition condition. We explore some of the possible explanations for our 
findings in the next section. 
 
Insert Table 6 about here 
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DISCUSSION 
Effects of Regulation and Competition 
Our results provide support for all hypotheses except two and eight. While hypothesis 
two was rejected, we found partial support for hypothesis eight. In keeping with findings in prior 
research, based primarily on institutional and stakeholder perspectives of corporate governance, 
stronger and more effective regulation tends to foster better corporate governance. As firms 
increasingly comply with such mandated standards, similarities in mechanism, practices and key 
stakeholder groups result in increased within-country convergence. We also find that as 
hypothesized, competition has a positive effect on variation in firm corporate governance scores. 
Based on agency and resource-dependence theories, we argued that firms would attempt to 
distinguish themselves from competitors on the basis of corporate governance in order to enjoy 
lower costs of capital and differential access to resources, resulting in greater variation in 
corporate governance. Hypotheses three, six and seven, which dealt with interactive conditions 
of regulation and competition all received support. We relied on all four theories of corporate 
governance: agency, stakeholder, resource-dependence, and institutional, to argue that interactive 
conditions place multiple, sometimes opposing pressures on firms, leading therefore to a 
negative effect on firm corporate governance scores, and a positive effect on variation in 
governance scores, respectively.  
Hypotheses two was not supported. We had predicted that competition would have a 
positive effect on firm corporate governance. Our argument was based on the premise that the 
competitive benefits accruing from corporate governance would serve as impetus for firms to 
enhance the latter. However, the results suggest that as competition increases, firms may actually 
dilute corporate governance than enhance it. Looking back to theory, we see that this is not in 
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contradiction with institutional and stakeholder theories of governance – possibly, firms have 
little to gain from consonance with institutional norms, or would not be subject to punitive costs 
for non-compliance with mandate. However, we it difficult to reconcile this finding with the 
tenets of agency and resource-dependence theory, which in fact are the basic theoretical drivers 
behind out arguments relating competition to corporate governance. An alternative explanation is 
that our data cover countries where the forces of competition are not as yet sufficiently 
developed for us to be able to find effects of competition as hypothesized. However, this is an 
insufficient alternate explanation for the results because our measure of competition is relative to 
a large set of countries, including many developed economies such as the United States. 
Therefore, it is not likely that our results are affected by the choice of countries in our dataset, 
which is indeed a sample representative of the global population.  
We therefore explain these results as follows: While our data are in themselves suitably 
rigorous, they do admittedly cover a number of countries that have recently engendered strong 
levels of competition – in other words, newly competitive economies. In such economies, it may 
be possible that firms do not adequately understand the potential benefits of governance, 
particularly since these benefits may not be well-institutionalized. In countries with a longer 
history of well-developed competition, the relationship between corporate governance and 
performance may be recognized and established enough to motivate firm governance behavior, 
and may therefore result in a positive relationship between competition and governance, as 
hypothesized. Therefore, while the level of competition in emerging economies is, per se, 
adequate to represent a sample of the global population, indeed there are differences in the 
processes underlying corporate governance, in such emerging economies.  
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Contrary to part of hypothesis 8 we find that variation in firm corporate governance 
scores is higher in conditions of strong regulation and strong competition, than in conditions of 
weak regulation and strong competition. While we expected that the coercive effects of strong 
regulation would always override the effects of competition, the results lead us to reconsider this 
view. We had, it appears, underestimated the isomorphic influences of competition, particularly 
in conditions where regulation is inadequate. Perhaps, there may be some form of governance 
threshold, beyond which the marginal costs associated with corporate governance is low, and 
proximity to this threshold may result in more idiosyncratic responses to environmental pressures. 
This would lead to variation in corporate governance as evidenced by the data.  
These explanations would not have been possible had we relied on a single theory of 
corporate governance alone. For example, reliance on institutional theory alone would not help 
us recognize the exceptions to the coercive isomorphic effects of regulation that are apparent in 
strong regulation and competition conditions. Similarly, reliance on agency theory alone may be 
inadequate to explain the impetus given to corporate governance in developing economies, 
where competition may be, comparatively, weaker. This is in keeping with the general trend 
expressed by many researchers, that a single model of corporate governance may not be 
applicable across all country contexts. For example, Lee & O‟Neill (2003) suggest that the 
precepts of agency theory, which dominates corporate governance in the U.S context, may not be 
generalizable to other countries. Perotti & von Thadden (2003) note that governance systems 
based on debt control, such as in European countries, are different from the Anglo-Saxon context 
of the U.S. and U.K., where management or equity control is more prevalent; and Berglof & 
Perotti (1994) suggest that country-specific phenomena, such as the Keiretsu system of corporate 
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governance can be effective means of ensuring internal discipline given the capital structure of 
Japanese firms.  
 
Within and Across-country Convergence 
We relied on the arguments of Aguilera & Jackson (2003), to propose that when firms 
within a country tend to be more similar to each other, they are likely to be different from firms 
in other countries. We find that both within-country convergence, and within-country divergence 
(implying cross-country convergence), are phenomena that can both be observed in our study. 
Our paper essentially demonstrates that multiple theories of corporate governance affect 
outcomes in each different environmental condition. Consequently, we conclude that different 
governance logics determine firm governance outcomes in each condition. Prima facie, this 
presents arguments in favour of the path dependence view of corporate governance (Bebchuk & 
Roe, 1999). As different logics shape the evolution of the governance environment in different 
countries, divergence becomes more likely. However, our results also show that strong 
competition does result in cross-country corporate governance convergence.  
Taking these observations in totality, we conclude that hybrid convergence, through the 
clustering of firms is the most likely outcome. That is, clusters of firms are likely to be similar in 
terms of their governance, with variations between clusters within a country. For example, while 
firms in the top score cluster of each country may be different from other clusters firms in the 
same country; these firms may be significantly similar across countries. Particularly, our earlier 
arguments that firms may enhance corporate governance to gain competitive benefits provides 
support for this view – across countries, top scorers may be motivated by the prospect of 
competitive benefits, irrespective of the strength or weakness of regulation in those environments, 
leading to across-country convergence.  
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CONCLUSION 
We draw upon multiple theories of corporate governance, namely, agency resource-
dependence, institutional and stakeholder perspectives, to examine the effects of regulation and 
competition on firm corporate governance. We found that regulation enhances firm corporate 
governance, and within-country convergence, whereas competition has a negative effect. We 
explore the interactive effects of regulation and competition, and specifically examined the 
distribution of corporate governance across four distinct interactive conditions. An interesting 
avenue for future research would be a longitudinal study that separates the effect of the intensity 
of competition and regulation (the focus of this study) on firm corporate governance from the 
temporal effect of the two forces as they gain foothold in a country. 
Our paper makes two key contributions. First, it provides an integrative view of corporate 
governance, whereby the processes underlying corporate governance may vary from country to 
country. Different governance logics affect firm governance in different environments, leading to 
variations in firm governance behavior. Reliance on a single theory of corporate governance is 
therefore inadequate when considering governance in its global context, and also, may preclude 
consideration of alternatives in the case of even a single country environment. Second, we 
contribute to the debate on within and across-country convergence of corporate governance, and 
suggest the occurrence of hybrid convergence as a way to reconcile the two opposing 
perspectives of corporate governance convergence. 
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 TABLE 1 
Summary of Hypotheses 
Hypothesis Argument Theoretical Perspective 
H1: Regulation positively 
affects firm CG 
Firms comply with regulation in order to avoid punitive measures Institutional 
Firms are required to better manage stakeholders, since the latter tend 
to be more empowered 
Stakeholder 
H2: Competition positively 
affects firm CG 
Firms benefit from reducing lower costs of capital, and reduced threat 
of takeover 
Agency 
Firms benefit from better access to resources Resource-dependence 
H3: The interaction of 
regulation and competition 
negatively affects firm CG 
Firms may face conflicting pressures since competitive benefits 
arising from differentiation on the basis of corporate governance will 
be contingent on the level of regulation 
Agency, Institutional, 
Stakeholder & Resource-
dependence 
H4: Regulation negatively 
affects variation in CG 
Greater compliance with mandated CG practices in order to avoid 
punitive measures reduces variation 
Institutional 
Better protection of stakeholder results in greater overlap of 
stakeholder groups, and consequently, similarities in stakeholder 
practices 
Stakeholder 
H5: Competition positively 
affects variation in CG 
Firms benefit from reducing costs of capital to levels lower than that 
of competitors 
Agency 
Firms benefit from differential access to resources Resource-dependence 
H6: The interaction of 
regulation and competition 
positively affects variation in 
CG 
Firms face conflicting pressures to converge on legally mandated CG 
and address stakeholder interests, and to distinguish themselves 
through better CG to enhance differential access to resources, and 
avoid takeover threats 
Institutional, Stakeholder, 
Resource-dependence & 
Agency 
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TABLE 2 
Country-wise Distribution of Data 
Environment Country 
Number of Firms in 
Sample 
   
Weak Regulation,  
 Weak Competition 
Indonesia 18 
Philippines 20 
Turkey 17 
   
Weak Regulation, 
Strong Competition 
India 79 
Korea 24 
   
Strong Regulation, 
Weak Competition 
Latin America 45 
South Africa 40 
   
   
Strong Regulation, 
Strong Competition 
China 25 
Hong Kong 38 
Malaysia 47 
Singapore 43 
Taiwan 47 
Thailand 20 
   
Total  463 
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TABLE 3 
Descriptives and Correlations 
Variables Mean s.d. Correlations (2-tailed significance) 
   1 2 3 4 5 
        
Firm CG 56.11 12.94 1     
        
Variation in Firm CG 3.10 5.27 -0.13** 1    
        
Country  0.72 0.45 -0.20*** 0.07 1   
        
Regulation 15.89 4.63 0.29*** -0.06 -0.69*** 1  
        
Competition 15.20 6.17 -0.07* 0.05 -0.05 0.57*** 1 
        
Interaction (Regulation X Competition)
a
 0.00 1.00 -0.11** 0.22*** 0.26 0.00 0.00 
        
p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
a
 Orthogonalized variable 
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TABLE 4 
Regression Results 
Predictors Firm CG
a
 
Variation in 
Firm CG
a
 
Intercept 
18.89*** 
(4.14) 
9.53*** 
(1.89) 
   
Country 
15.99*** 
(2.21) 
-3.34** 
(1.00) 
   
Regulation 
2.91*** 
(0.25) 
-0.48*** 
(0.11) 
   
Competition 
-1.35*** 
(0.13) 
0.24*** 
(0.6) 
   
Interaction (Regulation X Competition) 
-3.37 
(0.58) 
1.53*** 
(0.26) 
   
F Statistic 41.72 10.63*** 
Adjusted R
2
 
0.26 0.08 
R
2
 0.27 0.09 
** p < .01, *** p < .001. n = 463 
a
Unstandardized beta coefficient shown.  Standard errors in parentheses. 
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TABLE 5 
Post-hoc One-Way ANOVA Results: Firm CG 
 
Condition (I) N 
 
Mean 
(s.d) 
Mean Differences in Firm CG
a
 
       
   1 2 3 4 
       
Weak Regulation- 
Weak Competition 
55 
41.43 
(11.80) 
 -23.03*** -11.96*** -16.38*** 
       
Strong Regulation- 
Weak Competition  
85 
64.47 
(8.75) 
23.03***  11.07*** 6.65*** 
       
Weak Regulation- 
Strong Competition 
103 
53.4 
(10.58) 
11.96*** -11.07***  -4.41** 
       
Strong Regulation- 
Strong Competition 
220 
57.81 
(12.24) 
16.38*** -6.65*** 4.41**  
       
***p < .001 level, ** p < .01 level.  
a
ANOVA F = 50.34, p= 0.00. 
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TABLE 6 
Post-hoc One-Way ANOVA Results: Variation in Firm CG 
 
Condition (I) N 
 
Mean 
(s.d) 
Mean Differences in Variation in Firm CG
a
 
       
   1 2 3 4 
       
Weak Regulation- 
Weak Competition 
55 
7.30 
(8.79) 
 5.96*** 5.93*** 3.75*** 
       
Strong Regulation- 
Weak Competition  
85 
1.34 
(2.16) 
-5.96***  -0.024 -2.2** 
       
Weak Regulation- 
Strong Competition 
103 
1.36 
(2.41) 
-5.93*** 0.024  -2.17*** 
       
Strong Regulation- 
Strong Competition 
220 
3.54 
(5.28) 
-3.75*** 2.2** 2.17***  
       
***p < .001 level, ** p < .01 level.  
a
ANOVA F = 21.55, p= 0.00. 
 
  
  
50 
 
 
FIGURE 1 
 
Effects of Competition and Regulation on Corporate Governance 
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APPENDIX A 
Competition and Regulation in Countries in Sample 
 
China. We find that China occupies the strong regulation and strong competition 
quadrant in our classification. China‟s focus on business regulation began a substantial amount 
of time ago, while the reform of state-owned enterprises (SOE) from the 1990s. This coupled 
with the social hangover of a communist regime suggests that China may find it easier to 
introduce and ensure compliance with regulation. However, in keeping with the need to foster a 
competitive business environment, such regulation has been used to develop an efficient business 
atmosphere, rather than create a protectionist economic regime. The China Securities Regulatory 
Commission has made tremendous efforts to increase the levels of transparency disclosure and 
efficiency of the environment as a whole, in a bid to attract foreign investors.  In terms of the 
competition in the environment, China excels on certain counts, but falls behind on others, 
suggesting that while the environment is highly competitive, it may not be well balanced. China 
has exhibited impressive growth rates particularly since its 2001 entry into the WTO. This, 
coupled with low costs and availability of basic resources such as labor, had led to very high 
foreign direct investment (FDI). However, capital markets remain very young, with 
approximately only five percent of the companies in the country listed on its stock exchange. 
Despite this particular shortcoming, many of these factors suggest that not only is China 
currently a well-regulated and competitive environment, but also has tremendous future 
potential, thereby justifying its classification. 
Hong Kong. We find Hong Kong classified as being strong on both regulation and 
competition, on the basis of WCR rankings. Hong Kong follows the common law system, 
considered as offering the highest protection to shareholders. In addition, its special dual status 
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has offered a climate that is similar in many ways to Western business environments, with 
commensurate institutional and regulatory environments. Hong Kong has also thereby positioned 
itself as a strong service-oriented economy. Services consistently contribute to over 80% of 
Hong Kong‟s GDP, and this coupled with excellent infrastructure, offers a highly efficient 
business environment, leading to its strong competition categorization in our study. 
India. Not surprisingly, our classification shows India‟s regulatory climate as weak. In 
general judicial efficiency is low, despite the extensive amounts of legislation found in India, and 
its common law tradition. Business legislation in particular facilitates bureaucratic inefficiency, 
further coupled with political interference. India also fares poorly in terms of its levels of 
corruption. However, India falls into the strong competition category. While GDP per capita is 
low, Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) is quite high. India‟s growth potential for direct investment 
abroad, exports of good and services, and overall resilience of the economy makes it an attractive 
environment. In particular, capital markets are very well developed, with a large percentage of 
domestic companies listed on stock exchanges. Labor is well-skilled and available. In general, 
India does well in terms of the availability of market intermediaries despite need to improve 
business infrastructure, thereby attracting foreign investors.  
Indonesia. Indonesia was one of the worst hit countries during the Asian Financial Crisis, 
and its recovery remains incomplete, leading to its position in the weak regulation, weak 
competition quadrant in our dataset. Per capita GDP is one of the lowest of all countries in our 
dataset, at USD 740. While the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA) has taken 
measures to ensure a recovery of capital markets, huge debts are still outstanding. In terms of its 
regulation, Indonesia follows the French legal tradition, observed by researchers to be the 
poorest for shareholder protection. This coupled with judicial inefficiency and political 
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interference in dealing with post-crisis recovery lawsuits and regulation places Indonesia in the 
weak regulation condition. 
Korea. South Korea ranks in our dataset as being weak on regulation but strong on 
competition. With a German legal tradition, Korea affords only moderate protection to 
shareholders, as compared to Common Law traditions. However, Korea‟s recovery, post the 
Asian Crisis, has been laudable. With the high proliferation of Internet Technology amongst its 
population, South Korea is emerging as a strong niche competitor in the IT industry. This also 
allows for increased development of capital markets through online trading and operations. 
Corporate Sectors reforms, which re-examined the Chaebol system and allowed for operation of 
market principles, and a strong emphasis on Foreign Direct Investment, support the strong 
compeitition categorization of Korea. 
Latin America. The countries of Latin America that we include in this study, namely 
Brazil, Chile and Mexico, all fall into the strong regulation and weak competition cell, on the 
basis of the WCR scoreboard. Despite histories of political strife, countries in Latin America 
have made efforts to ameliorate regulation. The process has been further supplemented by 
political reforms. While these have not yet resulted in significant increase in the competition in 
the environment, regulatory scores for these countries tend to be high. The emphases on ensuring 
sustainable development, and dealing with issues of poverty and population have been a 
consistent priority in recent years. However, issues relating to the liberalization of economies, 
and free trade have continued to restrict the development of a competitive environment. 
Malaysia. Malaysia displays consistently high per capita GDP amongst Asian countries, 
well over 3000 USD. Its legal system is predominantly influenced by Common Law. Malaysia‟s 
current ranking as strong on regulation and competition, on the basis of WCR components is also 
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a function of its economic and regulatory resilience. Despite inflation and other impacts post the 
Asian Crisis, legal proceedings against political leaders and members of government, and 
suggestions that its recovery policies were motivated by private interests, Malaysia has been 
successful in curbing inflation and increasing its foreign exchange reserves.  
Philippines. The current legal system of the Philippines is based on the French legal 
tradition, setting the tenor for lower shareholder protection. Furthermore, at the time period in 
question, the Philippines was the focus of political unrest, threats of rebellion and money 
laundering, all making for poor regulation. Philippines also had high inflation, high interest rates 
and currency instability, coupled with fiscal deficit. Since then however, the country has seen a 
period of political change, with the new government taking some measures to change the 
economic situation through liberalization and better business regulation, making the Philippines 
an interesting country to watch as it goes through its transition, despite its position in the weak 
regulation and weak competition cell, in our study. 
Singapore. Singapore consistently ranked as having a strong competitive environment, 
over diverse indicators and many years. With high investment in infrastructure, and numerous 
beneficial bilateral trade agreements, Singapore has since long been able to maintain its position 
as a highly ranked business environment, in terms of its efficiency and ease of transaction. Its 
emphasis on entrepreneurship and emerging industries, such as biotechnology, provide 
Singapore considerable current and long-term economic promise. The origins of Singapore‟s 
legal systems are in Common Law. A highly stable political environment, strong emphasis on 
business legislation and high quality of national governance, all contribute to Singapore‟s 
classification as a strong regulation environment. 
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South Africa. In the post-apartheid era South Africa‟s priorities have involved nation 
rebuilding and the provision of basic infrastructure and amenities to its people. Given this focus, 
it is not surprising that South Africa falls into the strong regulation category. However, as an 
economy that already lags due to the unusual lack of strong relations with many nations over the 
years, South Africa has been able to do little to boost its competitiveness. Costs of investment are 
high, and capital is not easily available. However, given that the country‟s economic future may 
well depend on exports, the strong focus on education in South Africa serves not only a social, 
but also economic purpose. 
Taiwan. Developing business relationships with China have further boosted the strong 
competitive environment in Taiwan. With large FDI flows into Taiwan from China over the last 
decade, the economy continues to be strong. Taiwan is an instance of Western business practices 
that have been integrated into the Asian context, leaving little concern on the efficiency of 
conducting business in the country. Despite hailing from a German law tradition, Taiwan is 
strong in regulation, given the transparency and ease of conduct of business in its environment. 
This offers support for our classification of Taiwan as being strong on both competition and 
regulation, in this study. 
 Thailand. Thailand has been one of the countries to recover best from the Asian 
Financial Crisis, particularly due to its dual emphasis on domestic consumption as well as 
international trade. Thailand has a liberal investment regime and does not impose export 
restrictions, foreign equity limits for manufacturing, or local content requirements. It also has 
lucrative taxation systems for foreign investors and expatriates. By offering the strongest benefits 
in regions, which are the least developed, Thailand aims to achieve all around economic health. 
With strong economic growth rates, spurred by credit spending, Thailand ranks as a strong 
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competitive environment, in our dataset. Furthermore, in recent times Thailand has enjoyed 
comparative political stability, leading to political reforms and clear policies that facilitate 
business. This coupled with its Common Law background place it in the strong regulation 
category. 
Turkey. Democratic tensions have highlighted a significant portion of Turkey‟s history, 
and these continue to affect its regulatory environment. Characterized by purported government 
inefficiency and high levels of corruption, Turkey ranks as weak on regulation. Its involvement 
in international territorial and sovereignty issues, notably the case of Cyprus Island, also 
contribute to overall uncertainty in its regulatory and competitive environments. The year 2001 
saw the height of an economic crisis for Turkey, thereby explaining Turkey‟s position in the 
weak competition category. While notable for its high inflation rates, substantial declines in 
these rates can be observed in years since the crisis.  With structural reforms and laws supporting 
Central Bank autonomy and business transparency, Turkey is interesting as a potential emerging 
market. 
  
 
